On Jan. 20, U.S. President Donald Trump said that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told him ''he wants to make a deal'' to end the Russia-Ukraine war. However, Trump said that he ''doesn't know'' if Russian President Vladimir Putin is willing to end the war, and claimed that Putin is ''destroying Russia by not making a deal,'' adding that ''He has to make a deal… I think Russia is going to be in big trouble. If you look at their economy, if you look at the inflation in Russia, I would hope he wants to make a deal.'' On Jan. 22, Trump posted on Truthsocial that if Russia did not make a deal soon, he would ''have no other choice but to put high levels of Taxes, Tariffs, and Sanctions on anything being sold by Russia to the United States, and various other participating countries.'' These statements seemed to contradict previous statements during the electoral campaign that primarily blamed Ukraine for the war and suggested that, due to escalation risks, most U.S. pressure would focus on Ukraine and less on Russia.
- On Jan. 22, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said ending the war would be the ''official policy'' of the United States under President Donald Trump but declined to provide a timeline for when this would take place. Rubio instead said the new Administration wants to find a resolution to the war that is ''sustainable,'' adding, ''We don't just want the conflict to end and then restart in two, three, four years down the road. We want to bring stability.''
- On Jan. 15, U.S. Secretary of Defence nominee Peter Hegseth said the Trump administration's Ukraine strategy ''is a presidential political decision'' and that Trump ''would like to see this as beneficial as possible for the Ukrainians. But this war has to end.'' Hegseth said he would ''ensure that the Department of Defense plays a key role in the whole-of-government effort to support the Special Presidential Envoy for Ukraine and Russia.''
- On Jan. 8, U.S. Special Envoy Keith Kellogg said he was confident Trump could reach a solution with Putin within 100 days of his inauguration, adding that it was ''his personal and professional goal to help Trump broker a solution by that point.'' Kellogg stressed that both he and Trump are aware that they have ''little time'' to find a solution to the Russia-Ukraine war.
High-level discussions between the White House and the Kremlin contacts will increase in the coming weeks as the United States seeks to explore options for ending the war. The Trump administration's commitment to high-level talks with the Kremlin in the coming weeks is a divergence from the previous administration's policy, which had very limited high-level contacts with Russian officials since the start of Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine and none at the presidential level. High-level contacts are likely to involve a phone call between Trump and Putin and a meeting between Special Envoy Kellogg and Kremlin officials, presumably led by Putin's foreign policy advisor Yury Ushakov, likely after Kellogg makes an expected visit to Ukraine in early February. The Trump administration will prioritize high-level talks with Moscow to end the Russia-Ukraine war in order to redirect resources toward countering China in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, the U.S. government wants its European NATO partners to increase their defense spending, which may happen if the eventual ceasefire agreement in Ukraine includes the long-term deployment of European troops in Ukraine, as Russia will continue to pose a conventional military threat to NATO. The Russian threat will be higher if there is no ceasefire, as Russian forces could continue to seize territory in Ukraine toward NATO borders should Western powers fail to provide more advanced and larger quantities of key weapons systems capable of arresting Russian advances, let alone stopping Moscow's ability to continue airstrikes deep inside Ukraine. The United States will also provide additional financial and military support for Ukraine, contingent on Kyiv mobilizing more troops, for example by lowering the mobilization age below the current 25 years old.
- The few contacts that did take place between Moscow and Washington under the previous Biden administration were directed at avoiding escalation rather than ending the war. In November 2022, then-CIA Director Bill Burns met with his Russian intelligence counterpart, Sergei Naryshkin, in Ankara, Turkey; the talks primarily concerned efforts to prevent escalation and deter potential tactical nuclear weapons use by Russia. Former U.S. Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin and U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan held conversations with their Russian counterparts on numerous occasions since 2022, but these contacts were also confined to warning Moscow of the potential consequences of escalation measures Moscow was considering.
Moscow is interested in high-level talks because it calculates they will reduce the urgency in the West for greater support to Ukraine while preserving Moscow's ability to achieve its goals at lower cost through negotiations or continued war if its demands go unmet. By showing interest in negotiations, Moscow wants to incentivize Western powers, and most importantly the United States, to pursue dialogue and concessions and ultimately compromise toward its position rather than resorting to escalation and pressure tactics, which impose higher costs on Russia. Moscow also believes that the very process of negotiations — and the possibility of the United States imposing an unsatisfactory deal on Ukraine — remains a potential pathway to achieving its maximalist goals of a friendly Ukrainian government by politically destabilizing Ukraine. Kyiv's acceptance of a settlement without security guarantees could fracture Ukrainian society between supporters and critics of the deal. This could weaken the Ukrainian government, produce significant social unrest and lead to new waves of emigration. Over time, this could lead to the rise of soft pro-Russian political forces focused on not antagonizing Moscow, similar to the Georgian Dream government that assumed power after Russia's 2008 invasion of Georgia. Despite its challenges, Russia's economy is unlikely to face a near-term crisis, especially if negotiations prevent tougher sanctions, while its military benefits from a growing manpower advantage over Ukraine. Therefore, Putin will be reluctant to make major concessions in the coming months, believing his position may only grow stronger after this year's fighting season. The Kremlin would only agree to an end of hostilities if it had high confidence the agreement would politically destabilize Ukraine and leave it even more vulnerable to future Russian aggression than simply continuing the war.
- Putin's rhetoric regarding Moscow's position in negotiations has not changed, and he has not provided examples of serious concessions he is willing to make, such as agreeing to foreign peacekeeping forces to secure Ukraine after a ceasefire and allowing the portion of the country unoccupied by Russia to integrate with the West.
- On the contrary, as recently as Jan. 20, Putin said, ''We need to eliminate the root causes of the crisis,'' which Putin sees in the pro-Western orientation of the Ukrainian government, and that ''the goal should not be a respite, but long-term peace,'' which Putin has on numerous occasions said will require Ukraine to adopt a neutral status that bars strong security ties with the West.
While a ceasefire is possible, the main obstacle to a peace deal will be providing security guarantees to Ukraine, which Moscow will push to minimize, meaning that a long-lasting peace remains unlikely. In initial talks with U.S. officials, Moscow will threaten to escalate the war if the United States implements new sanctions against Russia or if it increases military aid for Ukraine. Moscow will also oppose the deployment of Western troops in Ukraine to secure an eventual ceasefire, as this would allow Kyiv to continue its pro-Western course. Therefore, the biggest obstacle to the talks will be securing Ukraine after a ceasefire. Moscow will not be opposed to international peacekeeping forces along the line of contact between Russian and Ukrainian forces but will be adamant that they remain limited to only a few thousand soldiers from states acceptable to Moscow, such as from India or China, among others. Moscow will insist that Ukraine be barred from potential membership in NATO, that future Western arms deliveries to Kyiv must have clear limitations, and, most importantly, that any international peacekeeping contingent be too small and lack a rules of engagement mandate capable of deterring renewed hostilities should Moscow choose to reignite the war in years down the line. This position stands in stark contrast to President Zelensky's position, who will insist that tens of thousands of NATO forces be deployed to Ukraine to deter renewed Russian aggression. The Trump administration will say that European states would have to be responsible for any such force but will not demand Ukraine receive a strong deterrent capability in the form of European soldiers in peace talks, knowing this would cause the talks to stagnate. This raises the possibility of a U.S.-Russia ceasefire agreement that Kyiv opposes but could be forced to accept under the threat of diminished U.S. support.
- British Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte and other European leaders will discuss the deployment of European troops as part of a peacekeeping force at an ''informal retreat'' hosted by the European Union on Feb. 3. European and Ukrainian officials, as well as Western experts, believe a force of as many as 40,000 soldiers may be needed to secure an effective ceasefire, depending on factors such as their mandate for the use of force and how much the Ukrainian army would demobilize after a ceasefire.
Should a deal not be quickly reached, the United States, Russia and Ukraine will likely all reach for escalation measures to maintain leverage and continue the war, causing negotiations to stagnate amid an escalatory spiral and potentially preventing an end of the war this year. By not quickly ascending to Western visions for a ceasefire and peacekeeping force in Ukraine, the Kremlin will test the White House's threats to increase military support for Ukraine as a negotiation strategy. The Kremlin believes declining concessions in the short term comes at a low cost, considering the difficulty with which the United States passed last year's supplemental support package for Ukraine, which passed months late due to congressional gridlock. However, not wanting to see a significant decrease in its leverage, the Trump administration will likely encourage Congress to continue some military support for Ukraine while also increasing sanctions pressure on Russia in the coming months. This could include targeting Russia's oil revenues through new sanctions against the dark fleet transporting its oil. This would likely put upward pressure on global oil prices, but the administration may calculate that production increases could partially offset this effect. The Kremlin would decline major concessions in response to such measures, claiming they undermine the administration's claimed desire for a deal. This could cause the war to continue throughout much of 2025 as negotiations stagnate, though neither Moscow or Washington will forgo continued high-level contacts.
