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In Yemen, a potential government ground offensive against the Houthis would risk reigniting security threats to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and could undermine the Yemeni government's internal coalition. On April 14, The Wall Street Journal reported that U.S. and Yemeni officials claim discussions are underway about a potential offensive against the key Red Sea port city of Hodeidah as part of a ground offensive against the Houthi militant movement. Other reports in Bloomberg and Abu Dhabi's The National suggested that the attacks might even aim to retake Sanaa, the capital city, and involve tens of thousands of forces. The possible offensive appears to be in a planning phase, rather than a build-up phase, and it remains unclear as to how committed various partners would be in any of these possible scenarios. Indeed, the United Arab Emirates, a key backer of the Yemeni government and of powerful proxies on the ground like the Southern Transitional Council (STC), denied it was participating in such discussions. Despite uncertainty over the veracity of the media reports, they are the first to emerge since the United States launched its naval and aerial campaign against the Houthis in December 2023 (and which the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump has ramped up since March). This suggests that Washington is considering a more direct role in the now-frozen Yemeni civil war in an attempt to break the Houthis' resolve to continue attacking civilian ships in the Red Sea and launching missiles and drones at Israel in solidarity with Hamas in Gaza.

The U.S. military's Operation Prosperity Guardian has involved an extended campaign of air and naval strikes on Houthi leaders, positions and military infrastructure. The campaign is aimed at restoring freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and ending Houthi attacks against Israel, rather than remaking the balance of power in Yemen or restoring the U.N.-backed Yemeni government to power in the north. 
The current phase of Yemen's civil war began in 2014 when the Houthi movement seized control of Sanaa, in the aftermath of political destabilization brought about by the Arab Spring protest movement in 2011. Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies, including the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Sudan, intervened to roll back Houthi power in 2015. 
Yemen's civil war has largely been frozen since the Houthis and the government agreed to a U.N.-brokered ceasefire in April 2022. This ceasefire only lasted a few months before it lapsed in October 2022, but even so, it did not result in the resumption of widespread offensives and hostilities, nor did it presage the end of Houthi regional attacks against targets in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Since then, the Saudis and Houthis have been engaged in ongoing talks in an attempt to prevent a resumption of war. The conflict was frozen in part due to the aftermath of an unsuccessful Houthi offensive against the key central city of Marib in 2021, the sudden food and fuel price shocks that emerged after the Russian invasion of Ukraine (which disproportionately hurt poor, import-dependent countries like Yemen), and Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia and, particularly, the United Arab Emirates (which weakened the political appetite from the Gulf Arab states for continued military intervention). Even with the Houthis' intervention in the Gaza war on Hamas' behalf in November 2023 and the beginning of U.S. military operations under Operation Prosperity Garden the following month, the informal ceasefire remained largely in place. The Houthis briefly paused their attacks against Israel and civilian shipping during the Israeli-Hamas ceasefire in Gaza that lasted from January to March 2025, but resumed attacks when that truce collapsed in mid-March.

To keep the frozen conflict in Yemen stable, Saudi Arabia has also deposited cash directly into the Yemeni central bank to help pay salaries for government workers in both the Houthi-controlled north and government-controlled south. These Saudi efforts, however, have inadvertently helped the Houthis consolidate power in the north by stabilizing the economy.
The United Arab Emirates announced it was exiting Yemen in 2019, though it continues to have powerful proxies on the ground in the country. One of those proxies, the Giants Brigade, seized territory from the Houthis in January 2022, sparking a short Houthi strike campaign against Abu Dhabi that killed several civilians.
As intensified U.S. airstrikes fail to halt Houthi attacks on Israel and Red Sea shipping, Washington is increasingly likely to seek on-the-ground Yemeni partners to apply military pressure on the militant movement. U.S. air power will likely fail to thwart all Houthi attacks due to the group's decentralized military infrastructure, as well as its relatively low-tech weapons that rely on smuggling routes from Iran and using dual-use consumer goods. Meanwhile, in Washington, the political appetite for the ongoing airstrike campaign is weakening against the backdrop of growing costs and concerns that munitions used in Yemen may be better deployed to Europe or Asia. As a result, the United States will likely seek Yemeni partners to advance against the Houthis' frontlines on the ground. Such a plan would face major constraints, including hesitancy from key U.S. allies like the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. But if it did come to fruition, Hodeidah would be a particularly notable target, as it is the only major Red Sea port under Houthi control and would severely hinder the militants' ability to resupply and obtain critical imports of food and fuel for the north and put forces on the road to Sanaa. It would also deliver a blow to morale within the group and impair its ability to recruit fighters and retain the loyalty of the key tribes that comprise its coalition. However, Hodeidah is not the only potential target, with more limited ground offensives potentially taking place around Marib (where the United States is already conducting airstrikes) and Taiz. Should the United States and its on-the-ground partners attack these targets, it would signal Washington's interest in altering the balance of power in the Yemeni civil war without necessarily destabilizing the Houthis' overall position in the north. Indeed, the United States might prefer to more methodically climb the escalation ladder against the Houthis to conserve military resources, given that U.S. airstrikes are depleting stocks and the Houthis have shot down numerous surveillance drones. 

Dislodging the Houthis from Hodeidah, even if possible, would not necessarily weaken their ability to continue carrying out attacks on Red Sea shipping. Being forced farther into Yemen's interior could thwart some of the Houthis' shorter-range systems from being able to target ships passing regional sea lanes. However, the Houthis' vast arsenal and smuggling networks mean they would still likely be able to conduct some attacks, even if not at the same frequency, which would still be enough to deter most shipping companies from reentering the area. 
U.S. intelligence has not been able to identify all the smuggling routes by which the Houthis resupply their arsenal. Some of the Houthis' weapons, like their Sammad 3-style UAV drones, can be produced locally, and others, like their Zulfiqar medium-range ballistic missiles, are more likely to be imported in components from Iran. Yemen's long, porous borders, both by land and sea, make smuggling efficient, even with a large U.S. naval presence in the Red Sea and Arabian Sea trying to intercept such operations. 
An unconfirmed but assumed to be small number of U.S. special forces have long been deployed covertly in Yemen as part of counterterrorism efforts. However, putting more boots on the ground remains highly controversial in the United States, where the Trump administration is trying to retrench from the Middle East. 
New ground offensives would risk prompting the Houthis to redirect some of their long-range systems from Israel to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, targeting major cities like Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, and/or Gulf Arab energy infrastructure along the Persian Gulf. The Houthis have the capabilities to strike deep inside the Gulf Cooperation Council. In the past, these strikes have often been intercepted by U.S.-made air defenses, but have nevertheless rattled the political resolve of Gulf Arab governments and created uncertainty for businesses and investors looking to engage with these countries' economic diversification programs. Particularly if Gulf Arab-backed proxies, like the UAE-backed Giants Brigade, participate in ground offensives in Yemen, the Houthis would likely target their host countries in an attempt to undermine those governments' political resolve for backing such an offensive. While these attacks may not cause significant physical damage, they will still pose risks for civilians and undermine business and investor confidence in regional security conditions. 

Saudi Arabia is trying to convince businesses to move their regional headquarters to Riyadh, which, before the 2022 Yemen ceasefire, would see occasional ballistic missile attacks by the Houthis. 
Both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are also seeking to attract more tourism, an industry that is particularly sensitive to security incidents like missile and drone strikes. 
In prior phases of Yemen's civil war, the Houthis have struck major cities like Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, energy sites (like Saudi Aramco facilities) and airports. 
As a result of such risks, parts of the Yemeni coalition may be unwilling to participate in a U.S.-coordinated ground offensive against the Houthis, straining the Yemeni government's coalition and deepening its existing internal splits. Saudi Arabia, in particular, has recently shifted its approach to Yemen toward de-escalation and diplomacy rather than military pressure after years of unsuccessful campaigns to oust the Houthis from the north. Saudi-backed elements in the Yemeni coalition may be less willing to carry out ground offensives for fear of provoking direct strikes on Saudi Arabia again and undermining confidence in the kingdom's Vision 2030 economic diversification program. Riyadh will also be concerned that backing a U.S.-organized campaign against the Houthis might undermine its ongoing outreach to Iran, most recently evidenced by Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman's visit to the country on April 17. Without Saudi support, it is thus unclear if a U.S.-backed ground offensive would even be strong enough to take key cities like Hodeidah. And if such an offensive stalls out or results in military debacles, it would produce significant domestic political fallout among the Yemeni government's internal factions that would weaken its integrity as leaders trade blame for the offensive's failure. Conversely, if the offensive is successful without the full backing of the Yemeni government's coalition, it would deepen internal splits as the participating factions consolidate power and seize territory to raise money and recruit new fighters. Any ground offensive conducted against the Houthis without the full unity of the Yemeni coalition would likely also exacerbate tensions between Yemen's central government and its rivals, like the Southern Transitional Council (STC), as well as Saudi- and Emirati-backed factions, which would ultimately risk further balkanizing the war-torn country.

The last government offensive to recapture Hodeidah failed in 2018 due to international concerns that fighting in the port city would cause a humanitarian crisis in Yemen's north. The failed offensive contributed to the United Arab Emirates' decision to retrench from Yemen a year later. 
Saudi-backed factions and Emirati-backed ones have long-standing divisions over the future of Yemen and power sharing, with occasional clashes breaking out between them. The UAE-backed STC continues to want an independent South Yemen, something opposed by the Saudis. 

test again for article sync iIn Yemen, the U.S.'s Anti-Houthi Campaign Raises the Specter of a Government Ground Offensive

Media

South Sudan

Podcasts

Cyber

Environment, Science & Technology

Politics

RANE's Europe Analyst Matteo Ilardo and RANE's Director of Analysis Adriano Bosoni break down the economic and security ramifications of the shifting U.S.-Russia relationship for European countries and companies with interests in the region.

RANE is a global risk intelligence company that delivers risk and security professionals access to critical insights, analysis and support to ensure business continuity and resilience for our clients. For more information about RANE's risk management solutions, visit www.ranenetwork.com.RANE's Europe Analyst Matteo Ilardo and RANE's Director of Analysis Adriano Bosoni break down the economic and security ramifications of the shifting U.S.-Russia relationship for European countries and companies with interests in the region.

RANE is a global risk intelligence company that delivers risk and security professionals access to critical insights, analysis and support to ensure business continuity and resilience for our clients. For more information about RANE's risk management solutions, visit www.ranenetwork.com.

Drupal events test : Essential Geopolitics: The United States' Evolving Relationship With Russia

India and Pakistan's series of tit-for-tat diplomatic and economic moves following a deadly militant attack will heighten the risk of kinetic responses, such as airstrikes or special forces operations, while also fueling domestic unrest due to rising nationalist sentiment in both countries. On April 23-24, India and Pakistan announced a series of sweeping tit-for-tat measures to scale back bilateral ties following a deadly militant attack in Indian-administered Kashmir that killed 26 civilians and injured 17 others.

Test- for alias generation and tag v3 to v2: India-Pakistan Tensions Surge Following Deadly Kashmir Attack

Guidance

analytical guidance :: Anti-Hamas protests on rise in Gaza as group's iron grip slips

Graphics

The Islamic State Somalia Province will likely continue to retreat amid intensified counterterrorism operations, harming its capabilities and resulting in fighters carrying out only limited retaliatory attacks. If its foreign fighters leave Somalia, the risk they will plot attacks elsewhere will rise, while setbacks in Puntland could force Islamic State fighters in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa to intensify attacks to gain supplies.

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While Puntland forces with U.S. and UAE air support have made significant gains against the Islamic State, forcing its fighters to retreat, al Shabaab remains on the offensive as it expands operations across southern and central Somalia, strengthens regional ties with the Houthis and continues to carry out cross-border attacks. In November 2024, Puntland counterterrorism forces launched Operation Hilaac, an ongoing offensive aimed at countering the Islamic State threat. At the time, intelligence reports indicated that the number of Islamic State fighters, who included many foreign combatants, had grown from an estimated 200 to 300 in 2016 to approximately 1,000. Since the operation began, Puntland forces say they have killed hundreds of Islamic State foreign fighters, including those from Ethiopia, Morocco, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania and Yemen. Despite lacking support from the Somali federal government due to long-standing political disputes, Puntland has received external backing, primarily in the form of airstrikes targeting Islamic State positions,

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Columns

On Security

Islamic State fighters under pressure in Somalia from Puntland forces will seek refuge, causing the risk of attacks in other countries to rise if its fighters flee abroad. In Somalia itself, Houthi support would help al Shabaab intensify its attacks and advance on the capital; its potential infiltration of the military will weaken the government response to the insurgency.

Columns on geopolitics: This_is_acolumn_on_geopolitics_here

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Afghanistan

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Latest

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Snapshots

Kathmandu, NP UV Index Today
Thursday, April 17
Current UV
0
Low
Daily Max at 10AM
9
Very High
Daily Max UV Forecast
Friday, April 18
10
Very High
Saturday, April 19
9
Very High
Sunday, April 20
11
Extreme
Monday, April 21
12
Extreme
Legend
LOW
MODERATE
HIGH
VERY HIGH
EXTREME
Low: 0-2
Minimal sun protection required for normal activity. Wear sunglasses on bright days. If outside for more than one hour, cover up and use sunscreen. Reflection off snow can nearly double UV strength, so wear sunglasses and apply sunscreen on your face.
Raw data provided by: Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute (KNMI)
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Snapshot: Talks about UV index in Catmandu

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The committee hearing was overshadowed by Democratic senators questioning Gabbard and CIA Director John Ratcliffe over revelations that they and other senior Trump officials discussed military plans in a Signal messaging app group that included a US journalist

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Global Trade

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An alleged pause in U.S. offensive cyber activity targeting Russia and a broader reduction in focus on Russian cyberthreats would significantly undermine U.S. cyber defenses and could heighten U.S. organizations' exposure to Russian state-sponsored and cybercriminal operations

Stag Snapshots :: An Alleged U.S. Pause in Cyber Offense Operations Offers Russia an Opportunity

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On Geopolitics

Join RANE's Senior Analyst, Matthew Bey, Asia-Pacific Analyst, Nate Fischler, and Director of Analysis, Adriano Bosoni, for this live webinar exploring key topics identified in RANE's 2025 2nd Quarter Forecast:

• The intensification of the trade war between the United States and its main trading partners will force U.S. companies to accelerate imports ahead of tariffs, accept higher costs for goods and, in many cases, pass higher costs onto consumers.

• Additional U.S. tariffs on China will result in Beijing proportionally retaliating and increasing domestic economic support, while a trade deal with the White House is unlikely. Canada and Mexico will attempt to appease the United States with trade and security concessions in an effort to avert the negative impacts of tariffs.

Columns on Geopolitics :  A Ukraine ceasefire is possible | 2: 56

China's retaliatory measures against U.S. tariffs signal a significant escalation of the trade war and will dim the prospects of near-term talks, but the greater economic stakes for both countries will increase the likelihood of a trade deal in the medium to long term and will likely drive China to expand domestic stimulus measures.

China Abandons Restraint With Latest Trade Salvo Against the U.S.

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Global Elections

United States

Iran

Iraq

United Arab Emirates

Social Issues

The Dec. 4, 2024, assassination of UnitedHealthcare CEO Brian Thompson in New York City was a shocking event that has focused attention on the safety and security posture of corporate executives.

Stag Columns :  Considerations for Corporate Security in the Wake of the UHC CEO Assassination

U.S.-Iran Relations

As European leaders consider military deployment options in Ukraine to prevent a settlement that destabilizes both the country and Europe's broader security architecture, the Franco-British proposal for a limited but strategically positioned European force presents the most feasible and effective solution. However, significant political, logistical and financial constraints persist, particularly without U.S. backing, while Russia could exploit weak enforcement mechanisms to undermine any ceasefire.

Columns on Security: Weighing the Options for a European Deployment in Ukraine | 10:18 | updated for the second time

Senator Marco Rubio as secretary of state and Congressman Mike Waltz for national security adviser

Column on security: Senator Marco Rubio as secretary of state and Congressman Mike Waltz for national security adviser | 3: 02

The United States follows through with a on all imports and additional tariffs of 60% on China and 25% on Mexico and Canada, and most countries retaliate with similarly sized tariffs. High tariffs, coupled with a significant economic slowdown or crisis in China and/or Europe, trigger a global recession that is further intensified by these tariffs, leading most developing countries into a period of severe stagflation with high unemployment by late 2025 or early 2026. Many multinational corporations are already preparing for increased tariffs under Trump’s administration, but in this scenario, organizations face significantly higher tariffs, coupled with sharply reduced consumer and client spending power, leading to a substantial decline in sales volumes for numerous businesses. Organizations should be considering contingency plans to deal with a scenario with significantly lower demand and significantly higher prices, as many of the contingency plans in place to deal with high tariffs, such as stockpiling resources or boosting investment into alternative production locations, can create new risks if an organization's turnover is significantly lower, leading to inventory pileup and/or higher borrowing needs to fund projects.

Col on Geo: RANE's Top 10 Risks for 2025 | 6: 15

What Happened
Kenyan President William Ruto and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed to upgrade bilateral ties to a "new level" and strengthen cooperation in a range of sectors, including infrastructure, healthcare, science and technology, and security following a bilateral meeting, Reuters reported on April 24. This comes after Kenya secured close to $1 billion worth of investment pledges from Chinese entities at an investor roundtable in sectors such as manufacturing, agriculture and tourismWhat Happened
Kenyan President William Ruto and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed to upgrade bilateral ties to a "new level" and strengthen cooperation in a range of sectors, including infrastructure, healthcare, science and technology, and security following a bilateral meeting, Reuters reported on April 24. This comes after Kenya secured close to $1 billion worth of investment pledges from Chinese entities at an investor roundtable in sectors such as manufacturing, agriculture and tourism.

Why It Matters
Ruto's rapprochement with China highlights African countries' broader push to secure fresh funding and investments from outside powers after U.S. President Donald Trump's cuts to U.S. development aid, with these efforts likely to continue in the coming months. Expanded China-Kenya cooperation indicates that Ruto is looking to recalibrate his government's foreign policy toward greater multi-alignment in response to Trump's election, before which Ruto markedly leaned toward the United States. Kenya's limited exposure to U.S. "reciprocal tariffs," which would stand at only 10%, together with its tariff-free agreement with the European Union, means Chinese exporters may look to expand operations in the country to circumvent tariffs, although any such moves would likely largely remain limited to the lower end of global supply chains. Chinese investments in sectors such as healthcare and agriculture could help the Kenyan government reallocate some public expenditure to narrow funding gaps left by cuts to U.S. development aid or to support fiscal consolidation efforts. However, Ruto's rapprochement with China threatens to hinder cooperation with the Trump administration, which could, for example, decide to curb counterterrorism cooperation or intelligence sharing.
Background
Ruto is conducting a state visit to China from April 22 to 26. Ruto conducted a state visit to the United States in May 2024, following which Washington labeled Kenya a major non-NATO ally, a first for a sub-Saharan African country.

Test: Kenya, China: Nairobi and Beijing Upgrade Ties Following Ruto-Xi Meeting

Science & Technology

In this episode of Essential Geopolitics, RANE's Global Security Analyst Hellen Muzungu provides insight into the current political crisis in South Sudan.

RANE is a global risk intelligence company that delivers risk and security professionals access to critical insights, analysis and support to ensure business continuity and resilience for our clients. For more information about RANE's risk management solutions, visit www.ranenetwork.com.

Essential Geopolitics: South Sudan's Evolving Political and Security Outlook

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What Happened: France and India will cohost the AI Action Summit in Paris on Feb. 10-11, during which attendees will look broadly at artificial intelligence risks such as environmental impact, income inequality and bias, Reuters reported on Feb. 10. The summit brings together leaders from dozens of countries, including China, and top executives from major AI companies. 



COLUMN ON GEOPOLITICS: Cyberspace, France: AI Action Summit Held in Paris | 12: 32

U.S.: Activists have organized "Not My President's Day" demonstrations to oppose the Trump administration's policies on immigration, the restructuring of the federal government and other issues on the President's Day holiday on Feb. 17, likely creating localized transportation disruptions and limited risks of violence. The protests are intended to occur in all 50 states, but not all states appear to have formally organized protests. The majority of protests are planned at State Capitol and City Hall buildings or on major thoroughfares, including in California, Florida, Indiana, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Texas and Washington, D.C. Attendance will likely largely be in the dozens or low hundreds, but protests in New York City and Washington, D.C., could see participation in the thousands, creating localized transportation disruptions. The protests could escalate to violence, creating safety risks, particularly given

Situational Report: Political Instability & Social Unrest

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stag assessment :: US weapons left in Afghanistan sold to militant groups, sources tell BBC

India

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Norway

Russia

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Canada

Bangladesh

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Finland

Sweden

Turkey

Videos

Why is Turkey blocking Finland's and Sweden's accession to NATO?

Essential Geopolitics: Why Turkey Is Blocking NATO From Bringing in Sweden and Finland

Algeria

Broken Contracts in the Middle East

Stratfor Middle East and North Africa Analyst Emily Hawthorne updates the political and economic situation in Algeria.

Essential Geopolitics: An Update on Algeria

Three Geopolitical Events in the Week Ahead • Oct. 21, 2019

Three Geopolitical Events in the Week Ahead • Oct. 14, 2019

In this short video Middle East and North Africa Analyst Ryan Bohl discusses three events to watch for this week.

Three Geopolitical Events in the Week Ahead • Oct. 7, 2019

Three Geopolitical Events in the Week Ahead • Sept. 23, 2019

Three Geopolitical Events in the Week Ahead • Sept. 9, 2019

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan's strategic location and natural resources make it of significant interest to external powers, including Russia, China, and the United States.

The Fight for Russia’s Borderlands

Stratfor explains Uzbekistan's struggle to maintain internal unity while balancing against its regional neighbors and external powers.

Uzbekistan's Geographic Challenge

Global Perspectives

Partner Perspectives

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More than 4,500 American service members have been killed in Iraq since the U.S. invasion in 2003. Security issues and conditions in Iraq will dictate whether U.S. forces will remain and, if so, what will be their size and mission.

The United States does not have attractive options as far as its military presence in Iraq, but it has workable ones to achieve its strategic and security goals.

To Leave or Not to Leave: The U.S. Security Dilemma in Iraq

China

North Korea

Contributor Perspectives

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un faces a stark and narrow choice between denuclearizing or learning to accept China's growing control over his country.

By testing ICBMs and powerful nuclear weapons, the North Korean leader has placed himself in a strategic trap that threatens to leave his country at China's mercy.

North Korea's Kim Jong Un Finds Himself in a Bind of His Own Making

A Chinese effort to build influence in Africa includes a $140 million outlay to construct a new parliament building for Zimbabwe in its capital, Harare.

Infrastructure projects have helped Beijing build influence across the globe.

How Chinese Financing Is Fueling the World’s Megaprojects

Mongolia

Under President Khaltmaa Battulga, Mongolia has been deepening its relationship with Russia.

The East Asian nation is at the geographical nexus of the rivalry among China, Russia and the United States. It faces a difficult task navigating its precarious position.

How Great Power Competition Is Changing the Geopolitics of Mongolia

For Moscow, soft power is more about sowing discord among the Kremlin's enemies than singing Russia's praises.

Rather than trumpet Russia's praises overseas, Moscow's propaganda machine is focused more on undermining the Kremlin's enemies.

Russia Takes a Hard Approach to Soft Power

Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the late founder of Kataib Hezbollah, commanded respect in Iraq. His death, more than Qassem Soleimani's in the same attack, soured many Iraqis on the U.S. presence in their country.

Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis fought Saddam Hussein, engineered attacks on Western embassies and took on the Islamic State. His death in the same strike that killed Iran's Qassem Soleimani increased local hostility to the U.S. presence in Iraq.

Reflections on the Life and Death of an Iraqi Militant

Guatemala

Guatemala is still working out the details of how it will implement a 'safe third country' agreement signed last year with the United States.

The country's new president is likely to use the questions surrounding the implementation of the 'safe third country' agreement to wrest additional support from the U.S.

Why the Details of a White House Asylum Deal Matter to Guatemala

Libya

Turkey is sending troops to Libya not to engage in conflict but to force a cease-fire.

By sending Turkish troops to defend Libya's U.N.-backed government, President Erdogan hopes to force a cease-fire that will protect his country's oil and gas interests in the Mediterranean and burnish his regional reputation.

The Factors Motivating Turkey in Libya

The Libyan Civil War

Turkey's Resurgence

United Kingdom

A photograph of "The Family of Henry VIII: An Allegory of the Tudor Succession," a 16th century painting attributed to Lucas de Heere. Under Henry VIII, England crashed out of a European union created by the Roman Catholic Church.

While there are few obvious historical analogies for the political crisis Britain's scheduled exit from the European Union has precipitated, there is one suggestive parallel -- and it prompts some sobering thoughts.

The U.K. May Find That Getting to Brexit Was the Easy Part

Technological advances have helped increase the number of major oil discoveries, including offshore sites that previously had been unreachable.

Technology has driven a number of recent major energy finds, but discovery does not always mean that production will follow.

Mapped: The World’s Biggest Oil Discoveries Since 1868

Japan

Taiwan

France

Germany

Greece

Italy

Throughout history, people have been attracted to aspects of cultures that wield hard power.

Whether and how people celebrate Christmas is clearly a complicated affair, bearing only a subtle relationship to Christianity itself. The contemporary, increasingly international version of Christmas is less a religious festival than a celebration of affluence, modernity, and above all Westernness. Without anyone willing it, Christmas has become part of a package of Western soft power.

The Geopolitics of Christmas

Ukraine

Moldova

An illustration of Russian and Moldovan flags.

Military & Security

The near rejection of the vote on EU membership reflects the continued strength of pro-Russian political forces ahead of the country's 2025 parliamentary election.